**Moral Supervenience**
**Definition**
Moral supervenience is the philosophical principle that moral properties depend upon, or are determined by, non-moral properties such that any change in moral properties necessarily entails a change in the underlying non-moral properties.
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**Moral Supervenience**
Moral supervenience is a foundational concept in metaethics, the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, status, and foundations of moral values and judgments. It articulates a relationship between moral properties—such as goodness, wrongness, or virtue—and non-moral properties, including natural, physical, or descriptive features of the world. According to the principle of moral supervenience, moral properties cannot vary without corresponding variations in non-moral properties. This means that if two situations are identical in all non-moral respects, they must also be identical in their moral properties.
The concept plays a critical role in debates about moral objectivity, moral realism, and the nature of ethical reasoning. It is often invoked to explain how moral judgments can be both objective and yet dependent on empirical facts about the world. Moral supervenience also underpins various ethical theories and informs discussions about the possibility of moral knowledge, the nature of moral disagreement, and the relationship between ethics and other domains such as science and psychology.
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### Historical Background
The notion of supervenience originated in the mid-20th century within the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, where it was used to describe the dependence of mental states on physical states. Philosophers such as Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim developed the concept to address issues of mental causation and the mind-body problem. Subsequently, the idea was adapted to ethics to capture the dependence of moral properties on non-moral facts.
In moral philosophy, the principle of supervenience gained prominence in the latter half of the 20th century, particularly through the work of philosophers like Roderick Chisholm, David Brink, and Nicholas Sturgeon. It became a central tenet in metaethical theories that sought to reconcile moral objectivity with a naturalistic worldview.
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### Definition and Explanation
Moral supervenience can be formally stated as follows: there can be no difference in moral properties without a difference in non-moral properties. More precisely, if two possible worlds or situations are identical in all non-moral respects, then they must be identical in all moral respects.
This principle implies a dependency relation where moral properties are said to „supervene” on non-moral properties. The term „supervene” indicates that moral properties are not independent entities but rather depend systematically on the underlying non-moral facts. However, supervenience does not specify the nature of this dependence; it only asserts that moral differences cannot occur without non-moral differences.
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### Types of Supervenience
Philosophers distinguish several forms of supervenience, which differ in their strength and scope:
– **Weak Supervenience:** Moral properties supervene on non-moral properties within a single possible world. That is, if two situations in the same world are non-morally identical, they are morally identical.
– **Strong Supervenience:** Moral properties supervene on non-moral properties across all possible worlds. If two situations are non-morally identical in any possible world, they are morally identical.
– **Global Supervenience:** The moral properties of an entire world depend on the non-moral properties of that world. This form addresses the possibility that moral properties might depend on holistic features rather than local ones.
The most commonly endorsed form in ethics is strong global supervenience, which ensures that moral properties are fully determined by non-moral properties universally.
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### Significance in Metaethics
Moral supervenience is significant because it provides a framework for understanding how moral judgments relate to empirical facts. It supports the idea that moral properties are not arbitrary or disconnected from the world but are systematically linked to natural or descriptive features.
This principle is often used to defend moral realism—the view that moral facts exist objectively and independently of human opinions—by showing that moral facts are grounded in non-moral facts. It also helps to explain moral disagreement: if two parties disagree morally, they must be disagreeing about some non-moral facts or their interpretation.
Moreover, moral supervenience is central to the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Cognitivists, who hold that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, often appeal to supervenience to argue that moral truths depend on factual conditions. Non-cognitivists, who deny that moral statements are truth-apt, must account for the apparent systematicity that supervenience captures.
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### Relation to Moral Objectivity and Moral Realism
Moral supervenience is closely linked to the concept of moral objectivity. If moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, then moral truths are not arbitrary but are constrained by the facts of the world. This supports the realist position that moral statements can be objectively true or false.
However, supervenience alone does not guarantee moral realism. It is compatible with various metaethical positions, including some forms of anti-realism or constructivism, provided they accept that moral properties depend on non-moral properties in some systematic way.
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### Challenges and Criticisms
Despite its widespread acceptance, moral supervenience faces several challenges:
– **The Problem of Moral Particularism:** Some philosophers argue that moral judgments do not always depend on fixed sets of non-moral properties but can vary with context, suggesting that supervenience may be too rigid.
– **The Issue of Moral Novelty:** Critics question whether all moral properties can be fully reduced to or determined by non-moral properties, especially in cases involving complex moral concepts like justice or rights.
– **The Challenge of Moral Irreducibility:** Some argue that moral properties have an irreducible normative aspect that cannot be captured by descriptive non-moral properties, challenging the supervenience thesis.
– **The Problem of Moral Disagreement:** Persistent and deep moral disagreements may indicate that moral properties do not supervene straightforwardly on non-moral facts, or that the relevant non-moral facts are themselves subject to interpretation.
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### Applications in Ethical Theory
Moral supervenience informs various ethical theories and approaches:
– **Utilitarianism and Consequentialism:** These theories often assume that moral rightness supervenes on the non-moral facts about consequences, such as pleasure or pain.
– **Deontological Ethics:** Deontologists may hold that moral duties supervene on non-moral facts about actions and intentions.
– **Virtue Ethics:** Virtue ethics can be interpreted as maintaining that moral virtues supervene on non-moral traits and behaviors.
– **Moral Naturalism:** This position explicitly endorses supervenience by identifying moral properties with natural properties.
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### Supervenience and Moral Epistemology
In moral epistemology, supervenience plays a role in understanding how moral knowledge is possible. If moral properties depend on non-moral properties, then moral knowledge may be attainable through empirical investigation combined with rational reflection. This supports the view that moral reasoning involves both factual inquiry and normative evaluation.
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### Conclusion
Moral supervenience is a central and influential concept in contemporary metaethics. It articulates a dependency relation between moral and non-moral properties, ensuring that moral differences are grounded in factual differences. While it supports the coherence of moral objectivity and informs various ethical theories, it also faces significant philosophical challenges. Ongoing debates continue to explore the implications and limits of moral supervenience in understanding the nature of morality.
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**Meta Description**
Moral supervenience is a key metaethical principle stating that moral properties depend on non-moral properties, ensuring that moral differences correspond to factual differences. This article explores its definitions, types, significance, challenges, and role in ethical theory.